From arnab.smtp at gmail.com  Sat May  1 02:11:15 2010
From: arnab.smtp at gmail.com (Arnab Chakraborty)
Date: Sat, 1 May 2010 11:41:15 +0530
Subject: [Avispa-users] INIT Problem
In-Reply-To: <x2jcb20a16f1004302310j95653f22x263679b0e1d82aee@mail.gmail.com>
References: <p2rcb20a16f1004300404p37b76b62xf37b4780d19eaca@mail.gmail.com> 
	<x2jcb20a16f1004302310j95653f22x263679b0e1d82aee@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <p2u3eb139771004302311g2770e789we871d73f787720d6@mail.gmail.com>

Here is an extract from my HLPSL specification:

*role environment()
def=
    local
        NHPwdA, NHPwdB, TempA, TempB : message,
        N : nat,
        Keyring : (agent.nat.message) set

    const
        a, b, s : agent,
        md5, inr : hash_func,
        sks : symmetric_key,
        apasswd, bpasswd, login, ok : text,
        fake : protocol_id

    init
        N := 1
        /\ NHPwdA := md5(md5(xor(apasswd, N)))
        /\ TempA := xor(NHPwdA, md5(sks.a))
        /\ NHPwdB := md5(md5(xor(bpasswd, N)))
        /\ TempB := xor(NHPwdB, md5(sks.b))
        /\ Keyring := {a.N.TempA, b.N.TempB}


    intruder_knowledge = {a, b, s, md5, inr, login, ok}

    composition
        session(a, s, apasswd, sks, Keyring)
end role*

It is generating the following error :

*%% Semantical warning: incomplete instantiation of a role call.
%%    The following variables have no value:
apply(md5,apply(md5,xor(apasswd,N))), xor(NHPwdA,apply(md5,pair(sks,a))),
apply(md5,apply(md5,xor(bpasswd,N))), xor(NHPwdB,apply(md5,pair(sks,b))),
set(pair(a,pair(N,TempA)),pair(b,pair(N,TempB)))*

It seems there is something wrong with the *init *section, but I cannot
figure out what. Can anyone help, please!

Regards,
Aki
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From dikeukaegbu at yahoo.com  Sat May  1 04:50:28 2010
From: dikeukaegbu at yahoo.com (Dike Andrew Ukaegbu)
Date: Sat, 1 May 2010 01:50:28 -0700 (PDT)
Subject: [Avispa-users] [Avispa User] Case study on IKE
Message-ID: <706707.97863.qm@web51603.mail.re2.yahoo.com>

I am looking for a documentation on a case study for IKE in AVISPA framework. Please where can I find it. I am doing an analysis of the protocol. 

DIKE ANDREW UKAEGBU






      

From dikeukaegbu at yahoo.com  Sun May  2 16:02:23 2010
From: dikeukaegbu at yahoo.com (Dike Andrew Ukaegbu)
Date: Sun, 2 May 2010 13:02:23 -0700 (PDT)
Subject: [Avispa-users]  [Avispa User] Case study on SIP and OTP
In-Reply-To: <63046.53098.qm@web27206.mail.ukl.yahoo.com>
Message-ID: <604899.98256.qm@web51604.mail.re2.yahoo.com>

I am also looking for a documentation on a case study for SIP and OTP in AVISPA framework.Thank you.

DIKE ANDREW UKAEGBU

Heriot Watt University, Edinburgh, UK

+447956970746 ?

LIFE IS EITHER A DARING ADVENTURE OR NOTHING AT ALL.

--- On Sun, 5/2/10, CHIKOUCHE Noureddine <chiknour28 at yahoo.fr> wrote:

>From: CHIKOUCHE Noureddine <chiknour28 at yahoo.fr>
Subject: Re : [Avispa-users] [Avispa User] Case study on IKE
To: "Dike Andrew Ukaegbu" <dikeukaegbu at yahoo.com>
Date: Sunday, May 2, 2010, 10:35 AM

in paper: 

http://www.avispa-project.org/delivs/6.1/d6-1.ps




--- En date de?: Sam 1.5.10, Dike Andrew Ukaegbu <dikeukaegbu at yahoo.com> a ?crit?:

De: Dike Andrew Ukaegbu <dikeukaegbu at yahoo.com>
Objet: [Avispa-users] [Avispa User] Case study on IKE
?: avispa-users at avispa-project.org
Date: Samedi 1 mai 2010, 10h50

I am looking for a documentation on a case study for IKE in AVISPA framework. Please where can I find it. I am doing an analysis of the protocol. 

DIKE ANDREW UKAEGBU






? ? ? 
_______________________________________________
Avispa-users mailing list
Avispa-users at avispa-project.org
http://mail63.csoft.net/mailman/listinfo/avispa-users






      


      
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From jasone.astorga at ehu.es  Fri May  7 04:16:25 2010
From: jasone.astorga at ehu.es (Jasone Astorga)
Date: Fri, 7 May 2010 10:16:25 +0200
Subject: [Avispa-users] 2 doubts regarding HLPSL
Message-ID: <002101caedbd$9635a3a0$c2a0eae0$@astorga@ehu.es>

Good afternoon everybody,

I'm a newbie with the HLPSL protocol and after spending some time trying to
model a security protocol with HLPSL I'm stuck with two doubts which I've
been not able to solve reading the manuals:

1)	Is it possible for two different agents to share a variable so that
when one of them changes the value of this variable, the other sees the
change? This kind of thing in order programming languages is achieved by
using global variables or passing arguments by reference, but in HLPSL I'm
not sure if it's possible to do something like that.

2)	If I have an agent that in a given state will behave differently
depending on the current value of a specific variable, how can I model it?
	For example, suppose that I want to model something like this: "if
N=0 do SND(A), if N=1 do SND (B)"
	Would it be correct to write something like this in HLPSL?

1.	State = 0 /\ N = 0 =>
	State' := 1 /\ SND(A)

2.	State = 0 /\ N = 1 =>
	State' := 1 /\ SND(B)

Or is there an executability problem with the second rule?

Many thanks in advance!!

Jasone


From ychevali at irit.fr  Fri May  7 04:20:53 2010
From: ychevali at irit.fr (Yannick Chevalier)
Date: Fri, 7 May 2010 10:20:53 +0200
Subject: [Avispa-users] 2 doubts regarding HLPSL
In-Reply-To: <885200478814862743@unknownmsgid>
References: <885200478814862743@unknownmsgid>
Message-ID: <q2qa12715c11005070120u13acd761p3f96f30bc2af6ae5@mail.gmail.com>

On Fri, May 7, 2010 at 10:16 AM, Jasone Astorga <jasone.astorga at ehu.es>wrote:

> Good afternoon everybody,
>
> I'm a newbie with the HLPSL protocol and after spending some time trying to
> model a security protocol with HLPSL I'm stuck with two doubts which I've
> been not able to solve reading the manuals:
>
> 1)      Is it possible for two different agents to share a variable so that
> when one of them changes the value of this variable, the other sees the
> change? This kind of thing in order programming languages is achieved by
> using global variables or passing arguments by reference, but in HLPSL I'm
> not sure if it's possible to do something like that.
>
it is possible, but only indirectly (a bit like in C):
declare a set  that contains only one value and pass its name to the two
roles.
For this to work you will of course need to ensure that there always is at
most
one element in the set.

2)      If I have an agent that in a given state will behave differently
> depending on the current value of a specific variable, how can I model it?
>        For example, suppose that I want to model something like this: "if
> N=0 do SND(A), if N=1 do SND (B)"
>        Would it be correct to write something like this in HLPSL?
>
> 1.      State = 0 /\ N = 0 =>
>        State' := 1 /\ SND(A)
>
> 2.      State = 0 /\ N = 1 =>
>        State' := 1 /\ SND(B)
>
> Or is there an executability problem with the second rule?
>
its spirit is correct, but "=>" transitions are reactions to events. You
should add
a RCV(smthg) (e.g. RCV(start)) to the left-hand side

bests,
Yannick




> Many thanks in advance!!
>
> Jasone
>
> _______________________________________________
> Avispa-users mailing list
> Avispa-users at avispa-project.org
> http://mail63.csoft.net/mailman/listinfo/avispa-users
>
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From jasone.astorga at ehu.es  Fri May  7 10:18:12 2010
From: jasone.astorga at ehu.es (Jasone Astorga)
Date: Fri, 7 May 2010 16:18:12 +0200
Subject: [Avispa-users] 2 doubts regarding HLPSL
In-Reply-To: <q2qa12715c11005070120u13acd761p3f96f30bc2af6ae5@mail.gmail.com>
References: <885200478814862743@unknownmsgid>
	<q2qa12715c11005070120u13acd761p3f96f30bc2af6ae5@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <004701caedf0$234d1a70$69e74f50$@astorga@ehu.es>

Thanks for your quick response.

Regarding the second issue, the RCV(smthg) can be exactly the same in both
cases:

1.      State = 0 /\ N = 0 /\ RCV(A) =>
       State' := 1 /\ SND(A)

2.      State = 0 /\ N = 1 /\ RCV(A) =>
       State' := 1 /\ SND(B)

The thing is that I have done it like that and when I check it with the
satmc --check_only_executability=true, it says that the second rule is not
executable...

Thanks!
Jasone

-----------------------------------
De: avispa-users-bounces at avispa-project.org
[mailto:avispa-users-bounces at avispa-project.org] En nombre de Yannick
Chevalier
Enviado el: viernes, 07 de mayo de 2010 10:21
Para: avispa-users at avispa-project.org
Asunto: Re: [Avispa-users] 2 doubts regarding HLPSL


On Fri, May 7, 2010 at 10:16 AM, Jasone Astorga <jasone.astorga at ehu.es>
wrote:
Good afternoon everybody,

I'm a newbie with the HLPSL protocol and after spending some time trying to
model a security protocol with HLPSL I'm stuck with two doubts which I've
been not able to solve reading the manuals:

1) ? ? ?Is it possible for two different agents to share a variable so that
when one of them changes the value of this variable, the other sees the
change? This kind of thing in order programming languages is achieved by
using global variables or passing arguments by reference, but in HLPSL I'm
not sure if it's possible to do something like that.
it is possible, but only indirectly (a bit like in C):
declare a set ?that contains only one value and pass its name to the two
roles.
For this to work you will of course need to ensure that there always is at
most?
one element in the set.

2) ? ? ?If I have an agent that in a given state will behave differently
depending on the current value of a specific variable, how can I model it?
? ? ? ?For example, suppose that I want to model something like this: "if
N=0 do SND(A), if N=1 do SND (B)"
? ? ? ?Would it be correct to write something like this in HLPSL?

1. ? ? ?State = 0 /\ N = 0 =>
? ? ? ?State' := 1 /\ SND(A)

2. ? ? ?State = 0 /\ N = 1 =>
? ? ? ?State' := 1 /\ SND(B)

Or is there an executability problem with the second rule?
its spirit is correct, but "=>" transitions are reactions to events. You
should add
a RCV(smthg) (e.g. RCV(start)) to the left-hand side

bests,
Yannick


?
Many thanks in advance!!

Jasone

_______________________________________________
Avispa-users mailing list
Avispa-users at avispa-project.org
http://mail63.csoft.net/mailman/listinfo/avispa-users



From jasone.astorga at ehu.es  Fri May  7 14:05:58 2010
From: jasone.astorga at ehu.es (Jasone Astorga)
Date: Fri, 7 May 2010 20:05:58 +0200
Subject: [Avispa-users] HLPSL and timeouts
Message-ID: <001e01caee0f$f1d37e10$d57a7a30$@astorga@ehu.es>

Dear all,

 

Is there a way of writing time-related events, such as timeouts, in HLPSL?

 

Many thanks!

Jasone

 

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From sunny.misra007 at gmail.com  Tue May 11 05:34:41 2010
From: sunny.misra007 at gmail.com (amit misra)
Date: Tue, 11 May 2010 15:04:41 +0530
Subject: [Avispa-users] Protocol simulation OSPA
Message-ID: <AANLkTimBvDjSZwsujROWBt3-wib1R16ukgfZDZe7VDK-@mail.gmail.com>

When I m pressing the protocol simulation button in SPAN then the program is
hanged and not responding message is displayed there.Can anybody help me out
in this code.Please it is urgent for me.
Code is :


role user(A, S : agent,

 Skey : symmetric_key,

SND_SA, RCV_SA : channel(dy))



played_by A

def=

local

State, N : nat,

H : hash_func,

HashPasswd, NthResponse, Challenge, Msg1, Msg2, Msg3, Msg4, R : message,

Apasswd, Nonce : text





init

State := 0 /\ N := 1



transition

 0. State= 0 /\ RCV_SA(start) =|>

   State' := 2 /\ Apasswd' := new() /\ HashPasswd' :=

H(H(xor(Apasswd', N))) /\ SND_SA( A.HashPasswd' )

/\ secret(Apasswd',apasswd, {A, S})



2. State = 2 /\ RCV_SA( S. ok) =|>

State' := 4 /\ SND_SA(A.S.login_request)

 4. State = 4 /\ RCV_SA(S.A.N.Challenge') =|>

State' := 6 /\ NthResponse' := H( H( xor( Apasswd,N ) ) )



 /\ R' := xor( Challenge', NthResponse')

/\ Msg1' :=

xor(H(NthResponse'),xor(H(R'),H(xor(NthResponse',inr(N)))))

 /\ Msg2' := xor(H(xor(Apasswd,N)),H(H(R')))

/\ Msg3' :=

xor(H(xor(NthResponse',H(R'))),H(H(xor(Apasswd,inr(N)))))

 /\ Msg4' :=

xor(H(H(H(xor(Apasswd,inr(N))))),H(H(H(R'))))

/\ SND_SA(Msg1'.Msg2'.Msg3'.Msg4')

 6. State = 6 /\ RCV_SA(S.A.Nonce') =|>

State' := 8 /\ request( S, A, auth, Nonce')

end role



role server(

S : agent,

SKey : symmetric_key,

SND_AS, RCV_AS : channel(dy))



played_by S

def=

local

 X : agent,

State, N : nat,

H : hash_func,

NthResponse, Challenge, HPasswd, HashPasswd, HR, NthCredential, H2PN1,
H3PN1,Hashpasswd : message,

 Msg1, Msg2, Msg3, Msg4, R : message,

Nonce : text

init

 State := 1 /\ N := 1



transition

 1. State = 1 /\ RCV_AS( X'.HashPasswd') =|>

   State' := 3 /\ HPasswd' := xor( HashPasswd', H( SKey, X' )) /\SND_AS(S.
ok)

 3. State = 3 /\ RCV_AS( X.S.login_request) =|>

State' := 5 /\ NthResponse' := HashPasswd

 /\ R' := new() /\ Challenge' := xor(NthResponse', R') /\

SND_AS(S.X.N.Challenge')

 5. State = 5 /\ RCV_AS( Msg1'.Msg2'.Msg3'.Msg4' ) =|>

State' := 7 /\ HR' := xor( H( xor( NthResponse, inr(N) ) ), xor( Msg1',

H( NthResponse ) ) )

 /\ NthCredential' := H( xor( Msg2', H( HR' ) ) )

 7. State = 7 /\ NthResponse = NthCredential --|>

State' := 8 /\ H2PN1' := xor( Msg3, H( xor( NthResponse, HR ) ) )

 /\ H3PN1' := xor( Msg4, H( H( HR ) ) )



8. State = 8 /\ H3PN1 = H( H2PN1 ) --|>

 State' := 9 /\ Nonce' := new() /\ SND_AS(S.X.Nonce') /\ witness( S, X,

auth, Nonce')



end role



role session(

A, S : agent,

SKey : symmetric_key

 )



def=

local

SND_AS, RCV_AS, SND_SA, RCV_SA : channel(dy)





composition

user(A, S, SKey, SND_SA, RCV_SA)

 /\ server(S, SKey, SND_AS, RCV_AS)



end role



role environment()

def=



const

 a,b,s : agent,

h,inr : hash_func,

login_request,ok : text,

apasswd,auth : protocol_id,

 skey : symmetric_key



intruder_knowledge = { a,s, h, login_request }





composition

session(a, s, skey)

/\ session(i, s, skey)



end role



goal

secrecy_of apasswd

authentication_on auth

end goal



environment()



Please help me out it is so urgent............


Thanks and regards,
Amit Mishra
M.tech,NIT Hamirpur
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From arnab.smtp at gmail.com  Tue May 11 10:11:12 2010
From: arnab.smtp at gmail.com (Arnab Chakraborty)
Date: Tue, 11 May 2010 19:41:12 +0530
Subject: [Avispa-users] Protocol simulation OSPA
In-Reply-To: <AANLkTimBvDjSZwsujROWBt3-wib1R16ukgfZDZe7VDK-@mail.gmail.com>
References: <AANLkTimBvDjSZwsujROWBt3-wib1R16ukgfZDZe7VDK-@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <AANLkTiloM6v8K4z_Q3KCd7yR-8XixL-7ix-g5HXe31dd@mail.gmail.com>

Dude, thats my code ... what are you doing with it???

Regards,
Aki


On Tue, May 11, 2010 at 3:04 PM, amit misra <sunny.misra007 at gmail.com>wrote:

> When I m pressing the protocol simulation button in SPAN then the program
> is hanged and not responding message is displayed there.Can anybody help me
> out in this code.Please it is urgent for me.
> Code is :
>
>
> role user(A, S : agent,
>
>  Skey : symmetric_key,
>
> SND_SA, RCV_SA : channel(dy))
>
>
>
> played_by A
>
> def=
>
> local
>
> State, N : nat,
>
> H : hash_func,
>
> HashPasswd, NthResponse, Challenge, Msg1, Msg2, Msg3, Msg4, R : message,
>
> Apasswd, Nonce : text
>
>
>
>
>
> init
>
> State := 0 /\ N := 1
>
>
>
> transition
>
>  0. State= 0 /\ RCV_SA(start) =|>
>
>    State' := 2 /\ Apasswd' := new() /\ HashPasswd' :=
>
> H(H(xor(Apasswd', N))) /\ SND_SA( A.HashPasswd' )
>
> /\ secret(Apasswd',apasswd, {A, S})
>
>
>
> 2. State = 2 /\ RCV_SA( S. ok) =|>
>
> State' := 4 /\ SND_SA(A.S.login_request)
>
>  4. State = 4 /\ RCV_SA(S.A.N.Challenge') =|>
>
> State' := 6 /\ NthResponse' := H( H( xor( Apasswd,N ) ) )
>
>
>
>  /\ R' := xor( Challenge', NthResponse')
>
> /\ Msg1' :=
>
> xor(H(NthResponse'),xor(H(R'),H(xor(NthResponse',inr(N)))))
>
>  /\ Msg2' := xor(H(xor(Apasswd,N)),H(H(R')))
>
> /\ Msg3' :=
>
> xor(H(xor(NthResponse',H(R'))),H(H(xor(Apasswd,inr(N)))))
>
>  /\ Msg4' :=
>
> xor(H(H(H(xor(Apasswd,inr(N))))),H(H(H(R'))))
>
> /\ SND_SA(Msg1'.Msg2'.Msg3'.Msg4')
>
>  6. State = 6 /\ RCV_SA(S.A.Nonce') =|>
>
> State' := 8 /\ request( S, A, auth, Nonce')
>
> end role
>
>
>
> role server(
>
> S : agent,
>
> SKey : symmetric_key,
>
> SND_AS, RCV_AS : channel(dy))
>
>
>
> played_by S
>
> def=
>
> local
>
>  X : agent,
>
> State, N : nat,
>
> H : hash_func,
>
> NthResponse, Challenge, HPasswd, HashPasswd, HR, NthCredential, H2PN1,
> H3PN1,Hashpasswd : message,
>
>  Msg1, Msg2, Msg3, Msg4, R : message,
>
> Nonce : text
>
> init
>
>  State := 1 /\ N := 1
>
>
>
> transition
>
>  1. State = 1 /\ RCV_AS( X'.HashPasswd') =|>
>
>    State' := 3 /\ HPasswd' := xor( HashPasswd', H( SKey, X' )) /\SND_AS(S.
> ok)
>
>  3. State = 3 /\ RCV_AS( X.S.login_request) =|>
>
> State' := 5 /\ NthResponse' := HashPasswd
>
>  /\ R' := new() /\ Challenge' := xor(NthResponse', R') /\
>
> SND_AS(S.X.N.Challenge')
>
>  5. State = 5 /\ RCV_AS( Msg1'.Msg2'.Msg3'.Msg4' ) =|>
>
> State' := 7 /\ HR' := xor( H( xor( NthResponse, inr(N) ) ), xor( Msg1',
>
> H( NthResponse ) ) )
>
>  /\ NthCredential' := H( xor( Msg2', H( HR' ) ) )
>
>  7. State = 7 /\ NthResponse = NthCredential --|>
>
> State' := 8 /\ H2PN1' := xor( Msg3, H( xor( NthResponse, HR ) ) )
>
>  /\ H3PN1' := xor( Msg4, H( H( HR ) ) )
>
>
>
> 8. State = 8 /\ H3PN1 = H( H2PN1 ) --|>
>
>  State' := 9 /\ Nonce' := new() /\ SND_AS(S.X.Nonce') /\ witness( S, X,
>
> auth, Nonce')
>
>
>
> end role
>
>
>
> role session(
>
> A, S : agent,
>
> SKey : symmetric_key
>
>  )
>
>
>
> def=
>
> local
>
> SND_AS, RCV_AS, SND_SA, RCV_SA : channel(dy)
>
>
>
>
>
> composition
>
> user(A, S, SKey, SND_SA, RCV_SA)
>
>  /\ server(S, SKey, SND_AS, RCV_AS)
>
>
>
> end role
>
>
>
> role environment()
>
> def=
>
>
>
> const
>
>  a,b,s : agent,
>
> h,inr : hash_func,
>
> login_request,ok : text,
>
> apasswd,auth : protocol_id,
>
>  skey : symmetric_key
>
>
>
> intruder_knowledge = { a,s, h, login_request }
>
>
>
>
>
> composition
>
> session(a, s, skey)
>
> /\ session(i, s, skey)
>
>
>
> end role
>
>
>
> goal
>
> secrecy_of apasswd
>
> authentication_on auth
>
> end goal
>
>
>
> environment()
>
>
>
> Please help me out it is so urgent............
>
>
> Thanks and regards,
> Amit Mishra
> M.tech,NIT Hamirpur
>
> _______________________________________________
> Avispa-users mailing list
> Avispa-users at avispa-project.org
> http://mail63.csoft.net/mailman/listinfo/avispa-users
>
>
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From zahisalima at yahoo.fr  Wed May 12 07:22:41 2010
From: zahisalima at yahoo.fr (Zahi Salima)
Date: Wed, 12 May 2010 11:22:41 +0000 (GMT)
Subject: [Avispa-users] Statistic for AVISPA tools
Message-ID: <76268.76110.qm@web24818.mail.ird.yahoo.com>

Bonjours,

est-ce que se trouve des papiers ou des ?tudes concernant les statistiques de l'utilisation des outils AVISPA par rapport les autres outils (Proverify, S3A, ...) dans la v?rification des protocoles cryptographiques..


Cordialement


      
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From Pascal.Lafourcade at imag.fr  Wed May 12 08:56:15 2010
From: Pascal.Lafourcade at imag.fr (Pascal LAFOURCADE)
Date: Wed, 12 May 2010 14:56:15 +0200
Subject: [Avispa-users] Statistic for AVISPA tools
In-Reply-To: <76268.76110.qm@web24818.mail.ird.yahoo.com>
References: <76268.76110.qm@web24818.mail.ird.yahoo.com>
Message-ID: <D8E7DBEB-C027-4D05-8AC3-1A995AED2640@imag.fr>

Hi,

Of course I can mention these papers :

[CLN09] Cas Cremers, Pascal Lafourcade, and Philippe Nadeau. Comparing  
State Spaces in Automatic Protocol Analysis .Formal to Practical  
Security, LNCS, volume 5458/2009, 2009. PDF | PS | Bibtex | Abstract

[LTV09] Pascal Lafourcade, Vanessa Terrade and Sylvain Vigier  
Comparison of Cryptographic Verification Tools Dealing with Algebraic  
Properties . In Proceedings of the sixth International Workshop on  
Formal Aspects in Security and Trust (FAST2009), November 2009,  
Eindhoven, the Netherlands. PDF | PS| Slide | Bibtex| Abstract

On May 12, 2010, at 1:22 PM, Zahi Salima wrote:

> Bonjours,
>
> est-ce que se trouve des papiers ou des ?tudes concernant les  
> statistiques de l'utilisation des outils AVISPA par rapport les  
> autres outils (Proverify, S3A, ...) dans la v?rification des  
> protocoles cryptographiques..
>
>
> Cordialement
>
> _______________________________________________
> Avispa-users mailing list
> Avispa-users at avispa-project.org
> http://mail63.csoft.net/mailman/listinfo/avispa-users

Pascal Lafourcade
-- 
Ma?tre de Conf?rences ? l'Universit? Joseph Fourier (UFR IMA).
Home Page : http://www-verimag.imag.fr/~plafourc/
Bureau : +33 (0) 4 56 52 04 14
Mobile : +33 (0) 6 83 54 90 70
Fax    : +33 (0) 4 56 52 03 44

Laboratoire VERIMAG, Equipe Distributed and Complex Systems.
Centre Equation CTL1/B4D
2, avenue de Vignate
38610 Gi?res
FRANCE




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From arnab.smtp at gmail.com  Mon May 17 14:54:01 2010
From: arnab.smtp at gmail.com (Arnab Chakraborty)
Date: Tue, 18 May 2010 00:24:01 +0530
Subject: [Avispa-users] XOR
Message-ID: <AANLkTil6GCkg6lvKQT5qWTHBy-ftn20FPX1M3LsPJtG4@mail.gmail.com>

Can anyone tell me a bit about the XOR in HLPSL. The AVISPA manual doesn't
provide much information on its usage.

Regards,
Aki
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From jwang at whu.edu.cn  Wed May 19 12:47:07 2010
From: jwang at whu.edu.cn (jwang whu.edu.cn (jwang))
Date: Wed, 19 May 2010 09:47:07 -0700
Subject: [Avispa-users] About  HLPSL
Message-ID: <fa5dac5827ffa.27ffafa5dac58@whu.edu.cn>

HI,
 
Now I want to use AVISPA tools to analysis a protocol,but I have a puzzle about authentication goals.What do "request and witness"  mean?When I should use "request" and when I shoud use "witness"?Are  there clear interpretation about authentication?
Help me,thank you.
Best,
Juan
 
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From ychevali at irit.fr  Wed May 19 12:58:35 2010
From: ychevali at irit.fr (Yannick Chevalier)
Date: Wed, 19 May 2010 18:58:35 +0200
Subject: [Avispa-users] About HLPSL
In-Reply-To: <fa5dac5827ffa.27ffafa5dac58@whu.edu.cn>
References: <fa5dac5827ffa.27ffafa5dac58@whu.edu.cn>
Message-ID: <AANLkTikPWNv6wQOkHtvYDuWNywkOT0A5e7o2nKNWm4fg@mail.gmail.com>

Hi,

the role of witness and request facts is to validate the existence of an
injective function
from events that correspond to the reception of a message to events that
*witness* the sending
of the message. When in the specification you want to store the fact that a
message payload M
is sent, use a witness with the parts of the message you want to keep track
of. When you receive
a message and want to query whether there is a matching witness fact, use a
request fact with
parts matching those of the witness fact you have written.

If you do not want to test for injective authentication (and thus agree to
not detect replay attacks)
you can use the weak version of the request. The semantics is then only to
validate the existence
of a function from request to matching witness facts...

best regards,
Yannick

On Wed, May 19, 2010 at 6:47 PM, jwang whu.edu.cn (jwang)
<jwang at whu.edu.cn>wrote:

> HI,
>
> Now I want to use AVISPA tools to analysis a protocol,but I have a puzzle
> about authentication goals.What do "request and witness"  mean?When I should
> use "request" and when I shoud use "witness"?Are  there clear interpretation
> about authentication?
>
> Help me,thank you.
>
> Best,
> Juan
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> Avispa-users mailing list
> Avispa-users at avispa-project.org
> http://mail63.csoft.net/mailman/listinfo/avispa-users
>
>
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From arnab.smtp at gmail.com  Wed May 19 15:36:54 2010
From: arnab.smtp at gmail.com (Arnab Chakraborty)
Date: Thu, 20 May 2010 01:06:54 +0530
Subject: [Avispa-users] About HLPSL
In-Reply-To: <fa5dac5827ffa.27ffafa5dac58@whu.edu.cn>
References: <fa5dac5827ffa.27ffafa5dac58@whu.edu.cn>
Message-ID: <AANLkTim5BoYzCL6MfX9dXSrBJVYQFVSFZROM_KwpvXYr@mail.gmail.com>

Dear Juan,

    Yannick has given a very proper description of "request and witness".
The way I understand *authentication* is that, sometimes (actually most of
the times) while specifying a protocol it is very important to make sure
that the *receiver* gets the exact message sent by the *sender*.
    When such an *authentication* goal is to specified in HLPSL, we use the
*request* and *witness*. When a sender sends any message, he/she may issue a
*witness* to denote that he/she needs the message to be correctly delivered
to the receiver. On the other hand, the receiver should issue a *request* to
answer the *witness*.

A *witness *of the form:
*witness( A, B, authNonce, Nonce')*
signifies that, I am agent *A*, and I am sending a *Nonce* to agent *B* and
I want to ensure that agent* B *received the exact value of* Nonce* I sent.
A corresponding *request *would be of the form:
 *request( B, A, authNonce, Nonce')*
 signifies that, I am agent *B*, and I received a *Nonce* from agent *A* and
I want to ensure that agent* A *sent me this value of* *the* Nonce* which I
received.
    The *authNonce* is a constant *protocol_id *which is to identify the
"witness-and-request" statements in the goals section.
    Although I have no idea about the internal workings of AVISPA, I like to
think that when a *witness* occurs, AVISPA stores the value (note it is the
value and not the name of the variable) somewhere, and compares it with the
value from the *request*. If the values match, the *authentication* goal is
not violated, else it is time to redesign your protocol. In the AVISPA
manual it is advised to put the *witness* and *request* sections in the
transitions when the values are generated and received, respectively.

    Note that through the *request *and *witness* sections no actual
information exchange between the agents take place, that is, they do not
contribute to the proceedings of the session (or protocol), it is just a way
to find detect a possible attack.

    At first authentication goals may seems illogical but they do turn out
to be very useful. For example, authentication goals can be very effectively
used to point out attacks which cause one participating agent to reach the
end of his/her transitions believing that he/she participated in a legal
session, while the other agent may not have completed the transitions or
even participated in the session.

    Hope I helped you.

Cheers,
Aki


On Wed, May 19, 2010 at 10:17 PM, jwang whu.edu.cn (jwang) <jwang at whu.edu.cn
> wrote:

> HI,
>
> Now I want to use AVISPA tools to analysis a protocol,but I have a puzzle
> about authentication goals.What do "request and witness"  mean?When I should
> use "request" and when I shoud use "witness"?Are  there clear interpretation
> about authentication?
>
> Help me,thank you.
>
> Best,
> Juan
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> Avispa-users mailing list
> Avispa-users at avispa-project.org
> http://mail63.csoft.net/mailman/listinfo/avispa-users
>
>
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From jwang at whu.edu.cn  Wed May 19 18:03:18 2010
From: jwang at whu.edu.cn (jwang whu.edu.cn (jwang))
Date: Wed, 19 May 2010 15:03:18 -0700
Subject: [Avispa-users] About  AVISPA
Message-ID: <f92ebbbf21f54.21f54f92ebbbf@whu.edu.cn>

Hi,
Can I define some new function in AVISPA?
For example,ksig=psha1(k,?).How to describe the function "psha1"?

Looking forward to your reply as soon as possible.Thank you for your help.

Best,
Juan
 
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From zahisalima at yahoo.fr  Thu May 20 10:12:19 2010
From: zahisalima at yahoo.fr (Zahi Salima)
Date: Thu, 20 May 2010 14:12:19 +0000 (GMT)
Subject: [Avispa-users] Detect of Attacks in  HLPSL
Message-ID: <781685.58176.qm@web24805.mail.ird.yahoo.com>

Hello,

How detect of attacks in HLPSL (technics and approaches) ? , for cases : the secrecy and authentication.



      
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From sunny.misra007 at gmail.com  Fri May 21 02:08:20 2010
From: sunny.misra007 at gmail.com (amit misra)
Date: Fri, 21 May 2010 11:38:20 +0530
Subject: [Avispa-users] Data is not recieved when I am using the XOR
Message-ID: <AANLkTil-NU00Vkbv0EUGlgM05fGMU2ZefA3BFOe1WVZM@mail.gmail.com>

hi,
Can anybody please help me out in handling the XOR function,i have simply
implemented the program to send and recieve message using XOR but the
message is not recived at user side.


role user(A,S : agent,
PK,SKey : symmetric_key,
SND, RCV : channel(dy))
played_by A
def=
local
State, N : nat ,
H : hash_func ,
HashPasswd, NthResponse, Challenge,K : message,
Apasswd, Nonce : text

init
State := 0 /\ N := 1
transition
 0. State= 0 /\ RCV(start) =|>
   State' := 2 /\ Apasswd' := new() /\ HashPasswd' := H(H(xor(Apasswd', N)))
/\ SND( A.{HashPasswd'}_PK)

2. State = 2 /\ RCV(S.{K'}_PK) =|>
   State' := 4 /\ SND(A.S.{K'}_PK)


end role
role server(
S : agent,
PK,SKey : symmetric_key,
SND, RCV : channel(dy))
played_by S
def=
local
X : agent,
State, N : nat,
H : hash_func,
NthResponse,HashPasswd: message,
 K: message,
Nonce : text
init
 State := 1 /\ N := 1
transition
 1.  State = 1 /\ RCV(X'.{HashPasswd'}_PK) =|>
      State' := 3   /\ SND(S.{ xor(HashPasswd',H(SKey.X'))}_PK)
 3.  State = 3 /\ RCV( X.S.{K}_PK) =|>
      State' := 5  /\ SND(S.ok)

 end role
 role session( A, S : agent, PK,SKey : symmetric_key)
 def=
 local
 SND, RCV : channel(dy)
 composition
 user(A, S,PK,SKey, SND, RCV)
 /\ server(S,PK,SKey, SND, RCV)
 end role
 role environment()
 def=
 const
 a,s : agent,
 h : hash_func,
 inr : hash_func,
 login_request, ok : text,
 apasswd, auth : protocol_id,
 pk,skey : symmetric_key
intruder_knowledge = { a,s,h,login_request }

 composition
 session(a, s, pk,skey)
/\ session(i,a,pk,skey)
end role
goal
secrecy_of apasswd
authentication_on auth
end goal

environment()

-- 
Thanks and regards


Amit Mishra
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From jwang at whu.edu.cn  Fri May 21 17:07:03 2010
From: jwang at whu.edu.cn (jwang whu.edu.cn (jwang))
Date: Fri, 21 May 2010 14:07:03 -0700
Subject: [Avispa-users] How to define new function in AVISPA
Message-ID: <fdf4f60c213b5.213b5fdf4f60c@whu.edu.cn>

Hi,
Can AVISPA define some new function,for example k2=psha1(k1,?),which means that the key k2 is derived by the function psha1 whose two argumnets are key k1 and the nonce ?.But I do not know how to describe the psha1 function in HLPSL?I know HLPSL can describe hash function.

Looking forward to your help.

Sincerely,
Juan
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From sunny.misra007 at gmail.com  Sat May 29 01:36:24 2010
From: sunny.misra007 at gmail.com (amit misra)
Date: Sat, 29 May 2010 11:06:24 +0530
Subject: [Avispa-users] Please help me in handling the XOR function.....
Message-ID: <AANLkTimmJWlk455lBCCzuqdaKj5QhQO1QMTmsrHqXpuA@mail.gmail.com>

Hi,
I am trying to simulate the protocol in which when I am sending the message
containing XOR hen only some part of the massage is recieved at reciver
side.For example in following code



role user(A, S : agent,
 Skey : symmetric_key,
SND_SA, RCV_SA : channel(dy))
played_by A
def=
local
State, N : nat ,
Hash : hash_func ,
HashPasswd, NthResponse, Challenge, Msg1, Msg2, Msg3,K : message,
Apasswd, Nonce : text,
SKey : symmetric_key
init
State := 0 /\ N := 1
transition
 0. State= 0 /\ RCV_SA(start) =|>
   State' := 2 /\ Apasswd' := new() /\ HashPasswd' :=
Hash(Hash(xor(Apasswd', N))) /\ SND_SA( A.HashPasswd' )
/\ secret(Apasswd',apasswd, {A, S})
2. State = 2 /\ RCV_SA(S.NthResponse') =|>
State' := 4 /\ SND_SA(A.S.login_request)

4. State = 4 /\ RCV_SA(S.ok) =|>
    State' := 6  /\ Msg1' := xor
(HashPasswd,xor(HashPasswd,Hash(NthResponse))) /\ Msg2' :=
xor(Msg1',Hash(xor(Apasswd',N))) /\  Msg3' :=
xor(Hash(Msg1'),Hash(Hash(Apasswd',inr(N))))

 /\ SND_SA(Msg1'.Msg2'.Msg3')
 6. State = 6 /\ RCV_SA(S.A.Nonce') =|>
 State' := 8 /\ request( S, A, auth, Nonce')

end role
role server(
S : agent,
SKey : symmetric_key,
SND_AS, RCV_AS : channel(dy))
played_by S
def=
local
X : agent,
State, N : nat,
Hash : hash_func,
NthResponse,HashPasswd,HR,NthCredential, H2PN1, H3PN1: message,
 Msg1, Msg2, Msg3,R,K: message,
Nonce : text
init
 State := 1 /\ N := 1
transition
 1.  State = 1 /\ RCV_AS(X'.HashPasswd') =|>
      State' := 3 /\ K' := (xor(HashPasswd',Hash(SKey.X'))) /\ SND_AS(S.K')
 3.  State = 3 /\ RCV_AS( X.S.login_request) =|>
      State' := 5  /\ SND_AS(S.ok)
 5. State = 5 /\ RCV_AS( Msg1'.Msg2'.Msg3') =|>
     State' := 7 /\ HR' := xor( Msg1',Hash( HashPasswd ))
                     /\ NthCredential' :=  xor( Msg2', HR' )
                     /\ Nonce' := new() /\ SND_AS(S.X.Nonce') /\ witness( S,
X,auth, Nonce')

 end role
 role session( A, S : agent, SKey : symmetric_key)
 def=
 local
 SND_AS, RCV_AS, SND_SA, RCV_SA : channel(dy)
 composition
 user(A, S, SKey, SND_SA, RCV_SA)
 /\ server(S, SKey, SND_AS, RCV_AS)
 end role
 role environment()
 def=
 const
 a,s : agent,
 h : hash_func,
 inr : hash_func,
 login_request, ok : text,
 apasswd, auth : protocol_id,
 skey : symmetric_key
intruder_knowledge = { a,s,h,login_request }

 composition
 session(a, s, skey)
/\ session(i, s, skey)
/\ session(i,a,skey)
end role
goal
secrecy_of apasswd
authentication_on auth
end goal
environment()


In this code when the server send the message SND_SA(S.K') to the user then
only  h(skey.a) is recieved at the user end.If anybody knows the problem
with code please tell me..................


Thanking You

-- 
Amit Mishra
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